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ANTITRUST AND TRADE REGULATION LAW
Michael F. Urbanski *
James R. Creekmore **
I. INTRODUCTION
During the past year, the United States Supreme Court, in two
decisions of significance, refused to summarily censure conduct
having legitimate, procompetitive benefits.' In similar fashion, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit continued to
scrutinize antitrust claims, rejecting those failing to measure up to
pleading and proof requirements,2 while also reaffirming the vitality
of the state action immunity doctrine as a bar to those that did.3
Meanwhile, Virginia's federal district courts grappled with time
worn conspiracy challenges to medical staff privileging decisions,4
while simultaneously forging new ground in one of the first cases to
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of William and Mary; J.D., 1981, University of Virginia School of Law. Mr. Urbanski is the
Chairman of the Business Litigation Practice Group at Woods, Rogers & Hazlegrove, P.L.C.,
and is a former Chairman of the Antitrust, Franchising and Trade Regulation section of the
Virginia State Bar.
•* Associate, Woods, Rogers & Hazlegrove, P.L.C., Roanoke, Virginia. B.A., 1990,
University of Virginia; J.D., 1993, William and Mary School of Law. Mr. Creekmore is a
member of the Business Litigation Practice Group at Woods, Rogers & Hazlegrove, P.L.C.,
and is both the Newsletter Editor and a member of the Board of Governors for the Antitrust,
Franchising and Trade Regulation section of the Virginia State Bar.
The authors wish to express their gratitude to Humes J. Franklin, III, William &
Mary School of Law, Class of 2001, for his assistance in the creation of this article.
1. See California Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 119 S. Ct. 1604 (1999); NYNEX Corp. v. Discon,
Inc., 119 S. Ct. 493 (1998); see also infra text accompanying notes 8-43.
2. See Omega World Travel, Inc. v. Airlines Reporting Corp., 172 F.3d 863 (4th Cir.
1999) (unpublished table decision) (full text available in Westlaw, No. 98-1033, 1999 WL
46756, at *1 (4th Cir. Feb. 3, 1999)); Levine v. McLesky, 164 F.3d 210 (4th Cir. 1998); see also
infra text accompanying notes 85-114.
3. See Carolina Water Serv., Inc. v. City of Winston-Salem, 161 F.3d 1 (4th Cir. 1998)
(unpublished table decision) (full text available in LEXIS, No. 97-2586,1998 U.S. App. LEXIS
22130, at *1 (4th Cir. Sept. 10, 1998)); American Int'l Security Specialists, Inc. v. Roberts, 161
F.3d 1 (4th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision) (full text available in LEXIS, No. 97-2089,
1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 22128, at *1 (4th Cir. Sept. 10,1998)); see also infra text accompanying
notes 64-84.
4. See Wuchenich v. Shenandoah Mem'l Hosp., No. 98-0041-H (W.D. Va. Jan. 29,1999);
see also infra text accompanying notes 199-221.
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consider market definition in the realm of electronic commerce over
the Internet.5
This article addresses antitrust decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, and state and federal courts of Virginia over the past year.
This article also provides an extensive analysis of the Virginia
Business Conspiracy Act,6 and the judicial treatment of claims
under the Act in recent years.
II. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
In 1998, in contrast to the rather controversial vertical price-
fixing decision handed down two years ago,7 the Supreme Court
reached a rather predictable result in NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc.'
The Court held that the per se prohibition against group boycotts
did not apply to a single buyer's decision to purchase goods or
services from one seller rather than another.9 Discon brought an
action against NYNEX, Materiel Enterprises ("Materiel"), and New
York Telephone Company, alleging that the defendants engaged in
fraudulent and anticompetitive business practices, causing
consumers to pay higher prices for the removal of obsolete telephone
equipment. ° Discon claimed that Materiel, a purchaser of these
services, selected another provider over Discon because the other
provider agreed to charge higher rates and rebate a portion of the
price increase back to Materiel."
The federal district court dismissed the complaint for failure to
state a claim. The Second Circuit affirmed" with one notable
exception: the appellate court found that some of Discon's allega-
tions stated both a Sherman Act section 1 claim, 3 as well as a
5. See America Online, Inc. v. GreatDeals.Net, 49 F. Supp. 2d 851 (E.D. Va. 1999); see
also infra text accompanying notes 115-45.
6. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-499 to -501 (Repl. Vol. 1996 & Cum. Supp. 1999); see infra text
accompanying notes 146-221.
7. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997) (overruling Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390
U.S. 145 (1968)).
8. 119 S. Ct. 493 (1998).
9. See id. at 495.
10. See id. at 496.
11. See id.
12. See Discon, Inc. v. NYNEX Corp., 93 F.3d 1055 (2d Cir. 1996).
13. See id. at 1059. Section 1 of the Sherman Act states:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is hereby declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or
engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be
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conspiracy to monopolize claim under section 2 of the Sherman
Act.14 In so holding, the Second Circuit reasoned that because the
complaint alleged that Materiel's buying decision was anticompeti-
tive, and no procompetitive rationale for discriminating in favor of
one supplier over another was advanced, the complaint stated a
claim under the rule of reason, if not under the per se rule as
applied to group boycotts. 5 Due to the uncertainty among the courts
of appeals regarding whether or when the per se group boycott rule
applied to a purchaser's decision to favor one supplier over another,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
16
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Breyer overturned the
Second Circuit decision, holding that the per se group boycott rule
does not apply where a single buyer favors one seller over another,
even for an improper reason." The prohibition against group
boycotts was originally set forth in Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, Inc. 8 In Klor's, the Court held that a conspiracy by numer-
ous household appliance manufacturers and their distributors to sell
to a single purchaser at higher prices was "not to be tolerated
merely because the victim is just one merchant."" Unlike the facts
in Klor's, however, the conspiracy alleged by the plaintiff Discon in
NYNEX did not involve a horizontal agreement between direct
competitors.2 °
Continuing the increasingly narrow treatment accorded the per
se rule in recent years, the Court indicated that its precedent
limited the per se rule in the boycott context to cases involving
deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not
exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by
imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the
discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
14. See Discon, 93 F.3d at 1062. Section 2 of the Sherman Act states:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not
exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by
imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the
discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
15. See Discon, 93 F.3d at 1062.
16. See NYNEX, 119 S. Ct. at 496-97.
17. See id. at 498.
18. 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959).
19. Id. at 213.
20. See NYNEX, 119 S. Ct. at 498.
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horizontal agreements among direct competitors. 2' The Court
rationalized its holding with that of Klor's by noting that "Although
Klor's involved a threat made by a single powerful firm, it also
involved a horizontal agreement among those threatened, namely,
the appliance suppliers, to hurt a competitor of the retailer who
made the threat."22 Because none of the participants in the alleged
boycott of Discon were competitors, the Court correctly declined to
apply the per se rule.23 Reasoning that the "freedom to switch
suppliers lies close to the heart of the competitive process that the
antitrust laws seek to encourage," and that such business practices
are not condemned by the antitrust laws, the Court recognized that
remedies exist under business tort or regulatory laws for a party
aggrieved by such actions.24
More recently, in California Dental Ass'n v. Federal Trade
Commission,25 the Court again demonstrated marked restraint in
refusing to condemn a nonprofit dental association's rules restrict-
ing price and quality advertising as anticompetitive under the
"quick look" rule of reason approach employed by the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC").26 Although all nine justices agreed that the
FTC had jurisdiction over the nonprofit California Dental Associa-
tion ("CDA") due to the substantial economic benefits the CDA
provided to its for-profit members,27 in a five to four majority
opinion written by Justice Souter, the Court held that the rule of
reason required a more thorough analysis of anticompetitive
measures when the effects of such measures were not "intuitively
obvious."
28
CDA is a group comprised of local dental societies to which
approximately 75% of California's dentists belong. 29 As a condition
21. See id.
22. Id. at 498.
23. See id.
24. Id. at 499. The Court also reversed the Second Circuit's finding that the complaint
stated a conspiracy to monopolize claim under section 2 of the Sherman Act because there
was no allegation that the purchasing practices harmed the competitive process, rather than
a single competitor. See id. at 500.
25. 119 S. Ct. 1604 (1999).
26. See id. at 1612.
27. See id. at 1607, 1611. In this regard, the Court distinguished the activities and
benefits of the CDA, which has for-profit subsidiaries that provide "advantageous insurance
and preferential financing arrangements" and "lobbying, litigation, marketing and public
relations for the benefit of its members' interest," from those of a nonprofit organization that
go no farther than merely providing professional education, the latter of which arguably may
lie outside the FTC's jurisdiction. Id. at 1611.
28. Id. at 1607.
29. See id.
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of membership, CDA members agree to abide by a Code of Ethics,
which includes a prohibition against advertising or soliciting
patients in any way that is false or misleading.3" In an administra-
tive complaint, the FTC charged that CDA applied this prohibition
so as to restrict even truthful and nondeceptive advertising,
particularly with respect to advertising related to discount pricing
and quality of services, violating section 5 of the FTC Act.3 ' The FTC
determined that the restrictions on price and quality advertising
were illegal per se under an abbreviated or "quick look" rule of
reason analysis.32 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with
the Commission's result, if not its methodology, finding that
although the per se analysis was improper for the price advertising
restriction, the abbreviated or "quick look" rule of reason analysis
was appropriate to invalidate the restrictions.33
Writing for the majority, Justice Souter disagreed with the Ninth
Circuit's view-which Justice Breyer adopted for the dissent34-that
the instant restrictions presented a situation where the anti-
competitive effects of the arrangements in question were obvious. 5
Justice Souter observed that the Court previously applied the "quick
look" rule of reason analysis only in those cases where "an observer
with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude
that the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive
effect on customers and markets."6 The Court declined to endorse
such an analysis in this situation, stating, "the case before us,
however, fails to present a situation in which the likelihood of
anticompetitive effects is comparably obvious."" The majority
therefore envisioned occasions where "CDA's advertising restrictions
might plausibly be thought to have a net procompetitive effect, or
possibly no effect at all on competition," thereby requiring more
than the cursory analysis afforded by either the FTC or the Ninth
Circuit.38 Hence, the Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's judgment
30. See id. at 1608.
31. See id. at 1608-09 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994)). Section 45 of title 15 states that
"[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared unlawful." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1994).
32. See California Dental Ass'n, 119 S. Ct. at 1609.
33. See California Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 128 F.3d 720, 726-27 (9th Cir. 1997).
34. See California Dental Ass'n, 119 S. Ct. at 1618 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
35. See id. at 1610.
36. Id. at 1612.
37. Id. at 1613.
38. Id.
1999]
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and remanded the case for a more comprehensive analysis under the
principles spelled out by the majority.39
The dissent, on the other hand, though agreeing that the "quality
of proof required" under a rule of reason approach "should vary with
the circumstances,"4" suggested that the four-pronged approach
utilized by the FTC and Ninth Circuit should adequately determine
the result.4 Specifically, the dissent offered "four classical, subsid-
iary antitrust questions" that must be addressed: "(1) What is the
specific restraint at issue? (2) What are its likely anticompetitive
effects? (3) Are there offsetting procompetitive justifications? (4) Do
the parties have sufficient market power to make a difference?"4
2
Finding an adequate evidentiary foundation in the record against
the CDA on each of these issues, the dissent would have refrained
from disturbing the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Finally, of interest to practitioners in the field, the Supreme
Court declined to hear a decision from the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit that reinstated a Sherman Act section 1 suit
dismissed by the lower court.44 In Virginia Vermiculite, Ltd. v. W.R.
Grace & Co.,41 the Fourth Circuit reversed the dismissal of a
Sherman Act section 1 claim.46 Virginia Vermiculite, Ltd. ("VVL")
alleged that the defendants conspired to constrain its operations
and, ultimately, its ability to compete with the defendant W.R.
Grace & Co. ("Grace"), the only other domestic producer of vermicu-
lite, when the defendants removed large quantities of vermiculite
reserves in Louisa County through non-mining agreements.47
Contrary to the findings of Judge Michael in the Western District of
Virginia, the Fourth Circuit found an adequate basis for a colorable
section 1 claim in the business transaction between the
defendants.4"
Grace donated to Historic Green Springs, Inc. ("HGSI"), a
nonprofit land conservation organization, 1400 acres of land
comprising over forty percent of the known vermiculite deposits in
39. See id. at 1618.
40. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
41. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
42. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
43. See id. at 1619-22 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
44. See Virginia Vermiculite, Ltd. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 156 F.3d 535 (4th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 119 S. Ct. 1458 (1999).
45. Id.
46. See id. at 542.
47. See id. at 538.
48. See id. at 539-42.
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the United States.4 9 The court noted that not only might the land
have been mined absent the non-mining agreements, but, "Absent
its transaction with HGSI [the nonprofit organization], Grace may
even have been required to grant VVL access to its Virginia
holdings, on the ground that failure to do so would constitute an
improper unilateral refusal to deal."5' Thus, the court concluded
that plaintiffs satisfied their burden of making only a "'colorable'
showing that it was 'reasonably probable' that the behavior in
question caused their injury."5'
The Fourth Circuit also disagreed with Judge Michael's decision
to dismiss plaintiffs section I claims on the ground that HGSI, a
nonprofit organization, was exempt from the antitrust laws. 2 The
Fourth Circuit reinstated VVL's section 1 claims against HGSI,
rejecting the lower court's rationale by which other circuits have
found nonprofit organizations exempt.53 Instead, the court relied on
the clear and unambiguous application of section 1 to every person
who acts in restraint of trade or commerce and the Supreme Court's
refusal to recognize a per se exemption for nonprofit organizations. 4
Lest there be any question, however, of the existence of such an
exemption, the Fourth Circuit explicitly delineated two bases that
removed HGSI from the protective umbrella of any such
exemption.55 First, the transaction that HGSI participated in with
Grace was "essentially commercial"; and second, HGSI conspired
with a nonexempt party with knowledge of the anticompetitive
effects of such conduct.
56
The result obtained at the Fourth Circuit as regards HGSI
compares favorably with the Supreme Court's recent holding in
California Dental Ass'n v. Federal Trade Commission," where the
Court concluded that the FTC Act gives the Commission authority
over nonprofit entities such as the CDA.5" The Court recognized
that, in determining the extent of the FTC's jurisdiction into the
49. See id.
50. Id. at 539.
51. Id. (citing Advanced Health-Care Servs., Inc. v. Radford Community Hosp., 910 F.2d
139, 149 (4th Cir. 1990)).
52. See id. at 538-39.
53. See id. at 540, 542.
54. See id. at 540.
55. See id. at 541.
56. See id.
57. 119 S. Ct. 1604 (1999). See supra text accompanying notes 25-43.
58. See id. at 1611.
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nonprofit arena, a "proximate relation to lucre must appear."59
Hence, nonprofit organizations engaged in commercial conduct
designed to contribute to their members' bottom lines could, in fact,
trigger the FTC's jurisdiction under the Act.60 Reconciling a conflict
among the circuits on this point, the Court recognized that applica-
tion of the Act to nonprofits such as the CDA comports with the
power of the Commission to prevent "unfair methods of competition
in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
or affecting commerce,"61 all of which may be seized upon just as
readily by nonprofit organizations organized on behalf of for-profit
entities as by for-profit organizations themselves.62 This holding and
rationale reinforces the Fourth Circuit's conclusion that the
"essentially commercial" nature of HGSrs transaction, together with
the fact of its combination with a for-profit entity in the business
operation at issue, brought HGSI within the scope of coverage of the
Sherman Act.63
III. CIVIL ANTITRUST SUITS
A. State Action Immunity
In Carolina Water Service, Inc. v. City of Winston-Salem," the
Fourth Circuit affirmed a district court decision exonerating the
City of Winston-Salem from charges of unlawful monopoly leverag-
ing 5 by "forcing" twenty-two residents of neighboring Forsyth
County to connect to a new public water service system.6 Carolina
Water Service alleged violations by the City of sections 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Act, resulting from the City's notice to residents of a
Forsyth County subdivision that they had one month to hook up to
the City's water service, or they would lose sewage service.67
59. Id.
60. See id. at 1611.
61. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (1994)).
62. See id. at 1611-12.
63. See Virginia Vermiculite, Ltd. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 156 F.3d 535, 538-39 (4th Cir.
1998).
64. 161 F.3d 1 (4th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision) (full text available in LEXIS,
No. 97-2586, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 22130, at *1 (4th Cir. Sept. 10, 1998)).
65. In recent years, the Fourth Circuit has assumed the existence of, but has yet to
recognize, a monopoly leveraging claim. See Advanced Health-Care Servs., Inc. v. Radford
Community Hosp., 910 F.2d 139, 149-50 & n.17 (4th Cir. 1990).
66. See Carolina Water Serv., 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 22130, at '1.
67. See id. at '4-5.
[Vol. 33:769
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In response, the City of Winston-Salem claimed immunity under
the state action doctrine.6" "Because the Sherman Act does not apply
to the conduct of a state acting through its legislature, states enjoy
full immunity from federal antitrust liability."69 This state immunity
is not afforded to municipalities, however, unless "the municipality
'demonstrates that [its] anticompetitive activities were authorized
by the State "pursuant to state policy to displace competition with
regulation or monopoly public service. '"'7 Counties and cities in
North Carolina are granted broad authority by the North Carolina
legislature to operate and regulate "public enterprises,"7' thus
satisfying the requirement for municipalities set forth in Town of
Hallie v. City of Eau Claire.72
Carolina Water Service also argued that the City lacked jurisdic-
tion in this instance to act under color of state authority because the
68. See id. The doctrine of state action immunity was first enunciated by the Supreme
Court in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943), where the Court held that the Sherman
Act was not intended to prohibit states from imposing restraints on competition. "Although
Parker involved an action against a state official, the Court's reasoning extends to suits
against private parties." Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471
U.S. 48, 56 (1985). The circumstances under which the state action doctrine immunizes
private conduct were refined in California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. MidcalAluminum,
Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980). The Court's opinion in Midcal establishes a two-prong test for
determining whether state regulation of private parties invokes state action immunity. See
id. at 105. "First, the challenged restraint must be 'one clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed as state policy'; second, the policy must be 'actively supervised' by the State itself."
Id. (citing City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389,410 (1978)); see also
Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. 48, 57 (1985); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471
U.S. 34 (1985). The Hallie Court applied the "clearly articulated state policy" test to
municipalities but held that active state supervision is not required to immunize their
conduct from the antitrust laws. See Hallie, 471 U.S. at 47.
The Court in Southern Motor Carriers took the Midcal analysis one step further and
addressed whether state compulsion is required to immunize the actions of private parties.
See Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 462-65. Discounting reliance on Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), for the establishment of a compulsion requirement, the Court
held that state compulsion is not a prerequisite to a finding of state action immunity:
A private party acting pursuant to an anti-competitive regulatory program need
not "point to a specific, detailed legislative authorization" for its challenged
conduct. As long as the State as sovereign clearly intends to displace competition
in a particular field with a regulatory structure, the first prong of the Midcal test
is satisfied.
Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 64 (citation omitted).
69. Carolina Water Seru., 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 22130, at *5 (citingHallie, 471 U.S. at
34-38).
70. Id. at *5 (alteration in original) (quoting Hallie, 471 U.S. at 39).
71. Id. at *7 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 153A-274, -275, -284 (Michie 1994 & Supp. 1997)
(counties); id. §§ 160A-311, -312, -317 (Michie 1994 & Supp. 1997) (cities)).
72. See Hallie, 471 U.S. at 39.
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affected subdivision was located in neighboring Forsyth County.73
The City of Winston-Salem and Forsyth County, however, entered
into an interlocal agreement in 1976 to consolidate their water and
sewage systems.74 The Fourth Circuit noted that "the North
Carolina Supreme Court has stated that when a local governmental
unit-pursuant to an interlocal cooperative agreement-operates a
water and sewage system for another local governmental unit, the
operating unit can exercise all of the rights for both local units with
respect to that system."7 ' The court therefore held that state action
immunity extended to protect the City's conduct.
76
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit also employed the state action
doctrine to affirm the dismissal of an antitrust challenge to the use
by a private security firm of off-duty Virginia police officers and
sheriffs deputies. 77 At issue in American International Security
Specialists, Inc. v. Roberts7 was competition for privately contracted
security services between a private security provider and off-duty
deputies and officers, the latter of whom utilized state and locally
supplied uniforms, badges, weapons, and other equipment during
their off-duty employment. 9
Applying the first prong of the state action test, the Fourth
Circuit held that Virginia Code section 15.2-1712, which authorizes
municipalities to adopt ordinances permitting law enforcement
officers and deputy sheriffs to engage in off-duty employment that
may require use of their police powers, constituted a clearly
articulated state policy."0 The court noted that the statute made it
foreseeable that Virginia officers and deputies might engage in off-
duty security work utilizing state supplied equipment, and that
result could clearly be foreseen to be anticompetitive." On this
basis, the court found that the state actors' activities were protected
by the state action immunity doctrine.8 2 This decision was consistent
with that in Command Force Security, Inc. v. City of Portsmouth,3
73. See Carolina Water Serv., 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 22130, at '2.
74. See id.
75. Id. at '8 (citing McNeill v. Harnett County, 398 S.E.2d 475 (N.C. 1990)).
76. See id. at *10.
77. See American Int'l Security Specialists, Inc. v. Roberts, 161 F.3d 1 (4th Cir. 1998)
(unpublished table decision) (full text available in LEXIS, No. 97-2089,1998 U.S. App. LEXIS
22128, at *1 (4th Cir. Sept. 10, 1998)).
78. Id.
79. See id. at '2.
80. See id. at '5 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1712 (Repl. Vol. 1997)).
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. 968 F. Supp. 1069 (E.D. Va. 1997).
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a similar case decided a year earlier in the Eastern District of
Virginia.84
B. Conspiracy Issues
In Omega World Travel, Inc. v. Airlines Reporting Corp.,85 the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals declined to infer the existence of an
antitrust conspiracy between the airlines and Airlines Reporting
Corp ("ARC"), a clearinghouse through which airlines and travel
agents communicate."8 Plaintiff Omega World Travel ("Omega"), a
large national travel agency, sued ARC claiming ARC entered into
a conspiracy with the other airlines to control the market for the
sale of airline tickets.8" Omega claimed that there was an industry-
wide agreement to use ARC and, thus, a conspiracy to restrain
competition.88 The court was unpersuaded, however, and affirmed
the district court's grant of summary judgment because of Omega's
failure to produce sufficient evidence to demonstrate the existence
of a conspiracy. 9 "[O]n summary judgment motions in antitrust
cases, the Supreme Court has instructed that when there is
evidence of conduct that is consistent with both legitimate competi-
tion and an illegal conspiracy, courts may not infer that an illegal
conspiracy has occurred without other evidence."
Citing Estate Construction Co. v. Miller & Smith Holding Co.,91
the court stated that "[it is not enough merely to state that a
conspiracy has taken place.' The appellant must show details of the
time, place and effect of the conspiracy." 2 The court found that
Omega produced only argument and speculation, and presented no
details of the time, place, and effect of the conspiracy:
84. For a thorough discussion of the court's decision in Command Force, see Michael F.
Urbanski & James R. Creekmore, Antitrust and Trade Regulation Law, 32 U. RICH. L. REV.
973, 979-82 (1998).
85. 172 F.3d 863 (4th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision) (full text available in
Westlaw, No. 98-1033, 1999 WL 46756, at *1 (4th Cir. Feb. 3, 1999)).
86. See Omega World Travel, 1999 WL 46756, at *3.
87. See id. at *1.
88. See id.
89. See id. at *3.
90. Id. at l (citing Thompson Everett, Inc. v. National Cable Adver., 57 F.3d 1317, 1323
(4th Cir. 1995) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588
(1986))).
91. 14 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 1994).
92. Omega World Travel, 1999 WL 46756, at '1 (quoting Estate Constr. Co. v. Miller &
Smith Holding Cp., 14 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 1994)).
1999]
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No evidence has been presented showing communications, meetings or other
methods through which a knowing participation in a scheme might be
inferred. In short, Appellant's case is based upon hypotheticals and
inference. And, although permissible inferences from the facts should be
drawn in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, those inferences
must "fall within the range of reasonable probability and may not be so
tenuous as to amount to speculation or conjecture." 3
ARC produced substantial evidence that travel agencies elected
to use the ARC system, instead of dealing individually with the
airlines, because it was more efficient and financially advanta-
geous.94 The Fourth Circuit also noted that Omega failed to present
any evidence inconsistent with legitimate conduct, which also
weighed against the inference of conspiracy."
In Levine v. McLeskey, s5 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the district court's dismissal of a Noerr-Pennington sham
exception claim 7 and held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel did
not bar litigation of conspiracy claims under the Sherman Antitrust
Act,9" the Virginia Antitrust Act,99 and the Virginia Business
Conspiracy Act.' 0
Levine developed Marina Shores, a Virginia Beach Marina
complex providing dry boat storage, wet slips, stores, and a
restaurant.10 ' Marina Shores directly competed with Lynnhaven Dry
Storage Marina, the region's principal dry storage marina owned by
McLeskey.' °2 Levine hired Norman Cohn to open and manage the
93. Id. at *3 (citations omitted) (quoting Thompson Everett, 57 F.3d at 1323).
94. See id. at *2.
95. See id. at *3 (quoting Oksanen v. Page Mem'l Hosp., 945 F.2d 696, 706 (4th Cir.
1991)).
96. 164 F.3d 210 (4th Cir. 1998).
97. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine exempts from antitrust liability efforts to petition the
government. See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R.
President's Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). Under this doctrine,
joint lobbying and other "efforts to influence public officials do not violate the antitrust laws
even though intended to eliminate competition. Such conduct is not illegal, either standing
alone or as part of a broader scheme itself violative ofthe Sherman Act." Pennington, 381 U.S.
at 670. Noerr-Pennington immunity has been expanded beyond efforts to influence legislation
to include activity directed at courts and administrative agencies. See City of Columbia v.
Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991). In City of Columbia, the Court distinguished
situations in which persons use the process of government as an anticompetitive weapon,
from those which use the outcome of the governmental process, ruling that whereas the
"sham" exception encompasses the former, it does not apply to the latter. See id. at 382.
98. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
99. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-9.5 (Repl. Vol. 1998).
100. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-499 (Repl. Vol. 1996 & Cum. Supp. 1999).
101. See Levine, 164 F.3d at 212.
102. See id.
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restaurant at Marina Shores. °3 Cohn formed Cohn-Phillips to lease
and manage the restaurant, and Levine advanced funds for start-up
costs and equipment.10 4 When Levine called in the loan following
construction, Cohn approached McLeskey, who then purchased a
one-half interest in Cohn-Phillips.' ° Cohn-Phillips subsequently
failed to pay rent on time, and Marina Shores filed an unlawful
detainer, seeking possession and damages for mismanagement. 10 6
Cohn-Phillips counterclaimed for breach of the lease, tortious
interference, and conspiracy to injure Cohn-Phillips's business. 10 7
Cohn-Phillips prevailed at trial in the Virginia Beach Circuit
Court,' but the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed on the grounds
that Cohn-Phillips's failure to pay rent constituted a breach of the
lease.109 Levine then initiated a federal court antitrust claim
asserting that the Cohn-Phillips state court counterclaims were
actionable as sham litigation under that exception to the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine. 110
The Fourth Circuit agreed with McLeskey that the Cohn-Phillips
counterclaims were not "objectively baseless" and thus not action-
able as sham litigation,"' but rejected the assertion that the
doctrine of collateral estoppel barred the plaintiff from asserting its
breach of lease and conspiracy claims." 2 The court held that
collateral estoppel did not apply because the final judgment in the
state court action was not based on fact finding favorable to Cohn-
Phillips."3 Thus, the federal and state antitrust conspiracy claims
were not precluded by collateral estoppel." 4
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See id. at 213; see also Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures
Indus., 508 U.S. 49,57 (1933) ("[An objectively reasonable effort to litigate cannot be a sham
regardless of subjective intent.").
112. See Levine, 164 F.3d at 213.
113. See id.
114. See id.
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C. Monopolization, Market Definition, and the Internet
In one of the first cases to consider market definition of electronic
commerce, Judge Lee of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia rejected a counterclaim that America
Online, Inc. ("AOL") monopolized and attempted to monopolize the
market for e-mail advertising of AOL subscribers inAmerica Online,
Inc. v. GreatDeals.Net.
115
AOL initiated the action against Martindale Empowerment
("Martindale")" 6 seeking damages and an injunction to prohibit
Martindale's practice of sending unsolicited bulk e-mail to AOL
subscribers." 7 Martindale filed counterclaims complaining of AOL's
attempt to block its transmissions, claiming inter alia, that AOL
engaged in monopolization, attempted monopolization, and inter-
fered with Martindale's business.
1 8
"To prevail on a monopolization claim, a party must show: (1)
possession of monopoly power in a relevant market; (2) willful
acquisition or maintenance of that power in an exclusionary
manner; and (3) causal antitrust inquiry.""9 The district court first
held that Martindale failed to adequately define the relevant market
as simply "e-mail advertising," with AOL's subscribers comprising
a "distinct submarket."2 ° The court noted that "In defining the
relevant product or service market, the court finds that there are
reasonable substitutes for advertising through AOL."121 The court
rejected Martindale's attempt to restrict the market to e-mail
advertising, finding that
There are numerous substitutes for e-mail advertising, some of which are
less expensive, including use of the World Wide Web, direct mail, billboards,
television, newspapers, radio and leaflets, to name a few. Even if the Court
restricted the market to e-mail advertising, interchangeable substitutes
115. 49 F. Supp. 2d 851 (E.D. Va. 1999).
116. "GreatDeals.Net" is an Internet domain name belongingto Martindale Empowerment,
which also owns the trade name GreatDeals. See id. at 853. Martindale's business included
sending commercial electronic advertising over the Internet marketing computers and
computer-related equipment. See id. at 853-54.
117. See id.
118. See id. at 854.
119. Id. at 857 (citingAspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585,596
n.19 (1985)).
120. Id. The court stated that "[a] relevant market has two dimensions: (1) the relevant
product market, which identifies the products or services that compete with each other, and
(2) the relevant geographic area within which competition takes place." Id.
121. Id. at 858.
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include other paid e-mail subscription services such as Microsoft Network
or Prodigy, or free e-mail services like Hotmail and Yahoo.'"
The court recognized that AOL subscribers could have chosen
another e-mail service and that such interchangeable services are
part of the relevant product.123 The court considered it improper to
define a market simply by identifying a group of consumers who
have purchased a given pro duct, 124 thereby distinguishing the
Supreme Court's recent opinion in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image
Technical Services, Inc.,125 which stated
This is not a*case like Eastman Kodak where a single brand of product or
service constitutes a relevant marketbecause it is unique. In this case, there
are other e-mail services that provide the same type of service as AOL.
Defendants could have advertised through another e-mail service and still
reached the Internet-accessing public. With respect to the relevant
geographic market in which competition takes place, the Court finds that
the Internet cannot be defined with outer boundaries. It is not a place or
location: it is infinite."
The court noted that Martindale ignored the fact that it had
multiple means of advertising its business to the Internet accessing
public.2 7 "The geographic market may not be restricted to AOL
subscribers not only because there are other persons with access to
the Internet, but also because there are other means of advertising
to those persons and to AOL subscribers." 21 While noting that
market definition often is a factual inquiry into the commercial
realities faced by consumers, 29 the court held that where the alleged
relevant market does not allege all interchangeable substitute
products, the alleged market is legally insufficient. 3 '
Not only was the relevant market alleged by Martindale legally
insufficient, the court held that it failed to adequately demonstrate
that AOL willfully acquired or maintained its alleged monopoly
122. Id.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
126. America Online, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 858.
127. See id.
128. Id.
129. See id. (citing Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 482).
130. See id. (quoting Rohlfing v. Manor Care, Inc., 172 F.R.D. 330,347 n.23 (N.D. Ill. 1997)
(holding that a proposed market definition was legally insufficient because it defined the
market in terms of a single class of customers).
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power in an exclusionary manner.' 31 The court noted that
Martindale made no showing of predatory conduct by AOL. 132
"Exploiting competitive advantage that is legitimately available,
however, does not amount to predatory conduct, even for a firm with
monopoly power."
3
The district court also considered insufficient Martindale's claim
of antitrust injury, which consisted of the allegation that AOL's
actions put the plaintiff out of business. 134 Following Advanced
Health-Care Services, Inc. v. Radford Community Hospital,3 5 the
court rejected the claim of antitrust injury for three reasons: (1) the
lack of anticompetitive intent; (2) the lack of competition between
Martindale and AOL; and (3) the absence of any causal connection
between AOL's conduct and the alleged loss of business. 36
The Court likewise dismissed Martindale's charge of attempted
monopolization. 3 7 "To establish attempted monopolization, a party
must show: (1) specific intent to monopolize the market; (2)
antitrust or predatory conduct designed to further that intent; and
(3) a dangerous probability of success."' The court noted that
Martindale failed to allege any conduct that would support an
inference of AOL's specific intent to monopolize. 139 At most,
Martindale alleged that AOL threatened others with lack of access
to AOL if they continued dealing with Martindale. 4 ' Rather than
being suggestive of an antitrust violation, the court considered these
efforts by AOL, to vigorously protect its subscribers from transmis-
sion of unsolicited bulk e-mail, to be insufficient to support an
inference of specific intent.''
Recognizing the virtually limitless expanse of the Internet, the
court found that AOL did not possess a dangerous probability of
successfully monopolizing the information services market, conced-
ing that it was
131. See id.
132. See id. at 859.
133. Id.
134. See id.
135. 910 F.2d 139 (4th Cir. 1990).
136. See America Online, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 860.
137. See id. at 861.
138. Id. at 860 (citing Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447,456 (1993); Abcor
Corp. v. AM Int'l, Inc., 916 F.2d 924, 926 (4th Cir. 1990)).
139. See id. at 861.
140. See id.
141. See id.
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unable to measure AOL's market share because the market in which AOL
participates is not defined. The Internet is not regulated and an entrant's
ability to participate in the market and offer services like that offered by
AOL is without boundary. Thus, even if the Court determined AOL's market
share to be relatively high, there is no dangerous probability of successful
monopolization where there are not substantial barriers to entry and there
are other factors that make the exercise of monopoly power unlikely. 42
Finally, Martindale also alleged that AOL denied it access to an
essential facility.' The court recognized an "essential facility" as
"one which is not merely helpful but vital to the claimant's competi-
tive viability."' 4 While the court conceded that plaintiff sufficiently
alleged that AOL controls an essential facility for access to all AOL
subscribers, it rejected application of the doctrine because
Martindale and AOL were not competitors, holding the essential
facilities doctrine to be inapplicable where the alleged monopolist
and the claimant do not compete.
145
D. Virginia Business Conspiracy Issues
The statutory basis for business conspiracy actions is found in
sections 18.2-499 and 18.2-500 of the Virginia Code. 14 The first
statute, criminal in nature, provides that "Any two or more persons
who combine, associate, agree, mutually undertake or concert
together for the purpose of... willfully and maliciously injuring
another in his reputation, trade, business or profession by any
means whatever ... shall be guilty of a Class I misdemeanor. "
147
Section 18.2-500 provides a civil remedy for anyone who believes he
or she has been "injured in his reputation, business or profession by
reason of a violation of [section] 18.2-499. " 14 If such a lawsuit is
142. Id.
143. See id. at 862. The court stated that
To plead monopolization through the "essential facilities" doctrine, [Martindale]
must allege (1) control of the essential facility by a monopolist; (2) a competitor's
inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility; (3) the denial
of the use of the facility to a competitor; and (4) the feasibility of providing the
facility to competitors.
Id. (citing Laurel Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. CSX Transp., Inc., 924 F.2d 539, 544 (4th Cir. 1991)).
144. Id.
145. See id. at 862-63.
146. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-499, -500 (Repl. Vol. 1996 & Cum. Supp. 1999).
147. Id. § 18.2-499(A) (Repl. Vol. 1996 & Cum. Supp. 1999).
148. Id. § 18.2-500(a) (Repl. Vol. 1996 & Cum. Supp. 1999).
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successful, the plaintiff may recover treble damages plus the costs
of the suit.1
49
The starting point for any interpretation of the Business
Conspiracy Act ("BCA") 5° must be the definition of conspiracy itself.
At common law, a conspiracy was "an unlawful combination of two
or more persons to do that which is contrary to law, or to do that
which is wrongful and harmful towards another person."' 5 ' In a
criminal case, a conspiracy is simply an agreement to commit a
crime.'52 The object of the conspiracy must be unlawful; it is
impossible to conspire to do what the law allows.'53
The elements of a claim under the BCA are relatively straightfor-
ward. According to the Supreme Court of Virginia, the two elements
are "(1) a combination of two or more persons for the purpose of
willfully and maliciously injuring plaintiff in his business, and (2)
resulting damage to plaintiff."'54 Courts have considered certain
aspects of these elements as follows.
1. A Combination of Two or More Persons
In Virginia, the doctrine of intra-corporate immunity has had an
important effect on the type and number of entities that can be
accused of forming a conspiracy to harm a business. Both state and
federal courts have repeatedly held that various legal entities are
incapable of forming conspiracies in and of themselves. 5 First, it is
clear that "By definition, a single entity cannot conspire with
149. See id.
150. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-499 to -501 (Repl. Vol. 1996 & Cum. Supp. 1999).
151. Werth v. Fire Cos.' Adjustment Bureau, 160 Va. 845, 854, 171 S.E. 255, 258 (1933).
152. See Wright v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 502, 505, 297 S.E.2d 711, 713 (1982).
153. See Leonard v. J.C. Pro Wear, Inc., 64 F.3d 657 (4th Cir. 1995) (unpublished table
decision) (full text available in Westlaw, No. 94-1498, 1995 WL 508894, at *6 (4th Cir. Aug.
29, 1995)); Baxter Research Med., Inc. v. KOL Bio-Med. Instruments, Inc., No. 97-1117-A,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4056, at *19-21 (E.D. Va. Mar. 2, 1998) (unreported decision); Meadow
Ltd. Partnership v. Heritage Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 639 F. Supp. 643, 653 (E.D. Va. 1986);
HechIer Chevrolet, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 230 Va. 396,402, 337 S.E.2d 744,748 (1985)
(citing Werth, 160 Va. at 855, 171 S.E. at 259). But see Reston Pressure Seal, Inc. v. Northern
Virginia Waterproofing, Inc., 19 Va. Cir. 545, 546 (Fairfax County 1988) (stating that phrase
"by any means whatever" eliminates requirement that a crime be committed in order to
obtain a civil remedy).
154. Allen Realty Corp. v. Holbert, 227 Va. 441, 449, 318 S.E.2d 592, 596 (1984); accord
Saliba v. Exxon Corp., 865 F. Supp. 306, 313 (W.D. Va. 1994), affd, 52 F.3d 322 (4th Cir.
1995) (unpublished table decision); Meadow, 639 F. Supp. at 652.
155. See, e.g., Sunsport, Inc. v. Barclay Leisure Ltd., 984 F. Supp. 418, 423-24 (E.D. Va.
1997).
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itself."'56 Because of the intra-corporate immunity doctrine,
employees acting within the scope of their employment are agents
of the employer and cannot conspire.157 The Fourth Circuit has
recognized a limited exception to the intra-corporate immunity
doctrine when the agents have an independent, personal stake that
is separate and apart from their involvement as agents of their
employer. 158 While this exception remains recognized, several
decisions have limited it in order to ensure that the rule is not
swallowed by the exception.'59
A corporation cannot conspire with its wholly-owned subsidiary.160
Further, two wholly-owned subsidiaries are incapable of conspiring
with each other.' 6 ' However, if the corporate veil is pierced, a
conspiracy can then be established between members of the
corporation. 162 Finally, the concept of intra-corporate immunity has
been applied to state agencies and their workers. 63
156. Fox v. Deese, 234 Va. 412, 428, 362 S.E.2d 699, 708 (1987); see also Selman v.
American Sports Underwriters, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 225, 238 (W.D. Va. 1988) (stating that a
corporation cannot conspire with itself); Charles E. Brauer Co. v. Nationsbank of Virginia,
NA., 251 Va. 28,36,466 S.E.2d 382,387 (1996) (stating that a principal and an agent cannot
conspire).
157. See Fox, 234 Va. at 428, 362 S.E.2d at 708; see also Detrick v. Panalpina, Inc., 108
F.3d 529,544 (4th Cir. 1997); Marmottv. Maryland Lumber Co., 807 F.2d 1180,1184 (4th Cir.
1986); Saliba, 865 F. Supp. at 313; Selman, 697 F. Supp. at 238; Reasorv. City of Norfolk, 606
F. Supp. 788, 797 (E.D. Va. 1984); Charles E. Brauer Co., 251 Va. at 36, 466 S.E.2d at 387.
158. See Detrick, 108 F.3d at 544; see also Greenville Publ'g Co. v. Daily Reflector, Inc., 496
F.2d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 1974); Levine v. McLeskey, 881 F. Supp. 1030, 1059 (E.D. Va. 1995),
affd in part, rev'd on other grounds, 164 F.3d 210 (4th Cir. 1998). The Supreme Court of
Virginia has not specifically recognized this exception. See Little Professor Book Co. ofReston
v. Reston N. Point Village, L.P., 41 Va. Cir. 73, 79 (Fairfax County 1996).
159. See General Nutrition Corp. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., No. 3:97cv490, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 4899, at *9 (E.D. Va. Jan. 12, 1998) (unreported decision); see also Oksanen v.
Page Mem'l Hosp., 945 F.2d 696, 705 (4th Cir. 1991); Selman, 697 F. Supp. at 239 (explaining
that the exception should not be interpreted so broadly as to permit the "independent
personal stake" to be merely an interest in the health and profitability of the corporation).
160. See Saliba, 865 F. Supp. at 313. The same holds true for partnerships; general
partners within a partnership are unable to conspire within the scope of their activities for
the partnership. See id.
161. See Advanced Health-Care Serv., Inc.v. Radford Community Hosp., 910 F.2d 139,146
(4th Cir. 1990) (holding that two subsidiaries wholly owned by same parent corporation are
legally incapable of conspiring under Sherman Act). But see In re Ray Dobbins Lincoln-
Mercury, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 203, 205 (W.D. Va. 1984) (holding intra-enterprise conspiracy
doctrine did not preclude a finding of conspiracy between two subsidiaries ofthe same parent
corporation in violation of Virginia Code section 18.2-500), affd, 813 F.2d 402 (4th Cir. 1985)
(unpublished table decision).
162. See Nedrich v. Jones, 245 Va. 465, 472-73,429 S.E.2d 201, 205 (1993).
163. See Beckerv. Russek, 518 F. Supp. 1040, 1045 (W.D. Va. 1981) (applying the doctrine
of intra-corporate immunity to the investigative/administrative arms of the State Board of
Medicine), affd, 679 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1982) (unpublished table decision); Fowler v.
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2. For the Purpose of Willfully and Maliciously Injuring Plaintiff
Once an initial showing of a conspiracy between at least two
entities is made, the next test is whether the conspiracy existed for
some unlawful purpose. A conspiracy must be formed "to accomplish
some criminal or unlawful purpose, or to accomplish some purpose,
not in itself criminal or unlawful, by criminal or unlawful means.""
It is not necessary that every conspirator act with legal malice.
"[T]he statute simply requires that one party, acting with legal
malice, conspire with another party to injure the plaintiff."'65 For
many years, Virginia's courts applied a "primary and overriding pur-
pose"166 test to the malice element, but more recent decisions require
only a showing of legal malice. 167 The restrictive construction
historically placed on the malice element by Virginia's courts was
done with good reason-the expansive treble damages remedy should
be available only in the most egregious cases of deliberate, wrongful
conduct intended to injure another's business.
3. In Its Business
Courts have repeatedly held that the focus of the BCA is on
injuries to business; other types of injuries are outside the scope of
the BCA. 6 A right of action under sections 18.2-499 and 18.2-500
arises "only when malicious conduct is directed at [a plaintiffs]
business, not against one's person."'69 The conduct must be directly
aimed at damaging the business, including injuries to one's property
Department of Educ., 472 F. Supp. 121, 122-23 (E.D. Va. 1978) (applying the doctrine to
officials of Department ofEducation). But see Monk v. Department ofTransp., 34Va. Cir. 374,
376-77 (Russell County 1994) (stating that Virginia Department of Transportation and its
employees are not "persons" under the statute).
164. Hechler Chevrolet, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 230 Va. 396, 402, 337 S.E.2d 744,
748 (1985); see also Potomac Valve & Fitting, Inc. v. Crawford Fitting Co., 829 F.2d 1280,
1284 (4th Cir. 1987); Virginia Vermiculite, Ltd. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 965 F. Supp. 802, 829
(W.D. Va. 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 156 F.3d 535 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
1458 (1999).
165. Multi-Channel TV Cable Co. v. Charlottesville Quality Cable Operating Co., 108 F.3d
522, 527 (4th Cir. 1997).
166. See Greenspan v. Osheroff, 232 Va. 388, 398-99, 351 S.E.2d 28, 35-36 (1986).
167. See Commercial Bus. Sys., Inc. v. BellSouth Servs., Inc., 249 Va. 39, 47, 453 S.E.2d
261, 266-67 (1995).
168. See, e.g., Peterson v. Cooley, 142 F.3d 181, 187-88 (4th Cir. 1998).
169. Buschi v. Kirven, 775 F.2d 1240, 1259 (4th Cir. 1985); see also Peterson, 142 F.3d at
187-88; Ward v. Connor, 495 F. Supp. 434, 439 (E.D. Va. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 657
F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1981); Moore v. Allied Chem. Corp., 480 F. Supp. 364, 375 (E.D. Va. 1979).
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interest.170 The damages cannot simply be the "result or secondary
effect of an action taken for mere personal gain."17 1 Virginia federal
courts have consistently resisted attempts to- apply the Act to
conspiracies directed at one's employment interest.'72 The existence
of a business is an issue for trial.173
4. Resulting in Damage to the Plaintiffs Business
Virginia is one of a minority of states that does not require, in
standard conspiracy cases, proof of an overt act in order to convict a
defendant of conspiracy. "In law the offense is the combination for
the purpose, and no overt act is necessary to constitute it.""7 Under
the BCA, defendants can be guilty of either conspiracy or attempting
to conspire,'75 however, the agreement or even an attempted
170. See Picture Lake Campground, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 858, 863-64
(E.D. Va. 1980).
171. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Jones, 577 F. Supp. 968, 970 (1984); see also Petra
Int'l Banking Corp. v. First Am. Bank of Va., 758 F. Supp. 1120,1142 (E.D. Va. 1991) (stating
that there is no injury if harm is the secondary or consequential result of parties' attempt to
protect themselves), affd sub nom. Petra Int'l Banking Corp. v. Dameron Int'l, Inc., 953 F.2d
1383 (4th Cir. 1992) (unpublished table decision).
172. See Clegg v. Powers, No. 97-0006-H, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17189, at *23 (W.D. Va.
Aug. 8, 1997) (unreported decision); see also Jordan v. Hudson, 690 F. Supp. 502, 507 (E.D.
Va. 1988), affd, 879 F.2d 98 (4th Cir. 1989); Campbell v. Board of Supervisors, 553 F. Supp.
644, 645 (E.D. Va. 1982). But see Holden v. Crippen, 32 Va. Cir. 67, 68-69 (Fairfax County
1993) (stating that law and medicine are professions, not employment, and thus injuries
thereto are actionable under the statute); Johnson v. Plaisance, 25 Va. Cir. 264, 267
(Charlottesville City 1991) (noting Virginia Supreme Court has not limited statutes as
narrowly as federal courts).
173. See Luckett v. Jennings, 246 Va. 303, 308, 435 S.E.2d 400, 402 (1993) (holding that
demurrer was improperly granted when factual questions existed to determine if the plaintiff
had a distinct business, separate from the corporation he formed with the defendants, and
whether there was an injury to that business distinguishable from the injury to the
corporation formed with the defendants).
174. Crump v. Commonwealth, 84 Va. 927,941-42,6 S.E. 620,628 (1888); see also Stevens
v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 238, 241, 415 S.E.2d 881, 883 (Ct. App. 1992) ("A crime is
'committed when the agreement to commit the offense is complete' and no overt act in
furtherance of the underlying crime is necessary."); Ramsey v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App.
265, 270, 343 S.E.2d 465, 469 (Ct. App. 1986) ("A conspiracy is committed when the
agreement to commit the offense is complete regardless whether any overt act in furtherance
of commission of the substantive offense is initiated."); VIRGINIAMODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS:
CRIMINAL, Conspiracy p. 1-321, at 1-322 (1998 Repl. Ed.).
175. See Multi-Channel TV Cable Co. v. Charlottesville Quality Cable Operating Co., 108
F.3d 522, 527 (4th Cir. 1997) (rejecting defendant's argument that a party cannot be liable for
attempting to conspire, holding that "the plain language of § 18.2-499(B) contemplates that
a party can be liable for attempting to conspire"); see also VA. CODEANN. § 18.2-499(B) (Repl.
Vol. 1996 & Cum. Supp. 1999) ("Any person who attempts to procure the participation... of
any one or more persons to enter into a [conspiracy]... shall be guilty of a violation of this
section. . .).
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agreement is not sufficient to impose liability; there must be proof
that some act was carried out that actually harmed plaintiffs
business. 176 "The gist of a civil action of conspiracy is the damage
caused by the acts committed in pursuance of the formed conspiracy
and not the mere combination of two or more persons to accomplish
an unlawful purpose or use other unlawful means."' 7 This is
important not only in terms of establishing a case for conspiring to
damage a business, but for purposes of establishing when the cause
of action accrues. The Supreme Court of Virginia has stated that "A
right of action accrues when any damage, however slight, is sus-
tained."171
Finally, although the Supreme Court of Virginia has not directly
addressed the issue, the Fourth Circuit recently determined that if
a conspiracy to harm a business is alleged in a civil case, proof of the
conspiracy must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. 79
In Peterson v. Cooley, ° the Fourth Circuit affirmed the grant of
summary judgment to defendants on a BCA claim, noting that "[w]e
need not pause long on this argument."'8 ' The court recognized that
while "a plaintiff need not prove personal spite" 2 . . . the alleged
conduct must at least be aimed at damaging another's business."'83
The court explained:
The Petersons have produced no evidence that Cooley or Central Fidelity
acted out of a desire to injure the Petersons in their business. Indeed, any
176. See CaterCorp, Inc. v. Catering Concepts, Inc., 246 Va. 22,28,431 S.E.2d 277,281-82
(1993).
177. Id.
178. Eshbaugh v. Amoco Oil Co., 234 Va. 74,77,360 S.E.2d 350,351 (1987). Federal courts
have held that because the statutes relate to the plaintiffs business - a property interest -
the five-year statute of limitations applies. See Marmott v. Maryland Lumber Co., 807 F.2d
1180, 1185 (4th Cir. 1986) (stating that the district court wrongly applied a one-year
limitation period to section 18.2-499); see also Federated Graphics Co. v. Napotnik, 424 F.
Supp. 291,293-94 (E.D. Va. 1976) (applying five-year period). The Supreme Court of Virginia
has not expressly addressed this question, but has applied the five-year limitation period
when the trial court and parties agreed that period was proper. See Eshbaugh, 234 Va. at 76-
77, 360 S.E.2d at 351. But see Mickey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 16 Va. Cir. 478, 479
(Alexandria City 1979) (citing Federated Graphics, but holding that allegation of malicious
prosecution involves wrongful conduct directed at a person, while statute addresses only
conduct directed at property; thus, conspiracy count was governed by one-year limitations
period).
179. See Peterson v. Cooley, 142 F.3d 181, 188 (4th Cir. 1998).
180. 142 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1998).
181. Id. at 188.
182. Id. (citing Commercial Bus. Sys., Inc. v. BellSouth Servs., Inc., 249 Va. 39, 47, 453
S.E.2d 261, 267 (1995)).
183. Id. (citing Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Jones, 577 F. Supp. 968, 970 (W.D. Va.
1984)).
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damage to the Petersons' business would only prejudice Cooley and Central
Fidelity's ability to recover as creditors. Moreover, Cooley acted for the
legitimate business purpose of protecting his RTC judgment against Barrie
Peterson. More generally, Cooley acted out of a legitimate business desire to
profit by the purchase of loans. Were we to allow the Petersons' suit to
proceed, we would subject every sale of debt to a potential conspiracy charge
by the disgruntled debtor."M
The Fourth Circuit's treatment of the business conspiracy allega-
tions in Peterson is consistent with the manner in which federal
courts have considered conspiracy allegations under the Sherman
Act over the last decade, and follows the teaching of the Supreme
Court in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.'85
In Matsushita, the Court required proof in an antitrust conspiracy
case "'that tends to exclude the possibility' that the alleged conspira-
tors acted independently. [A plaintiffi, in other words, must show
that the inference of conspiracy is reasonable in light of the compet-
ing inferences of independent action or collusive action that could
not have harmed [it]."' The Matsushita Court identified two
separate inquiries that are relevant to this issue: (1) whether the
defendant had "any rational motive" to join the alleged conspiracy,
and (2) whether the defendant's conduct "was consistent with the
defendant's independent interest."187 Thus, the Court stated that "if
[the plaintiff] had no rational economic motive to conspire, and if
[its] conduct is consistent with other, equally plausible explanations,
the conduct does not give rise to an inference of conspiracy."88
Moreover, where a conspiracy is economically implausible, the
antitrust plaintiff "must come forward with more persuasive
evidence to support [its] claim than would otherwise be neces-
sary." 189
Recently, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed a trial court's
finding of a violation of the BCA, but did so without any substantial
184. Id.
185. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
186. Id. at 588 (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984)).
187. Id. at 587.
188. Id. at 596-97.
189. Id. at 587. The Fourth Circuit has consistently indicated that conspiracies may not
be inferred where the defendant can articulate a rational business purpose for the challenged
conduct. See Laurel Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. CSX Transp., Inc., 924 F.2d 539, 543 (4th Cir.
1993) ("[Plaintiffs] must bring forward evidence that excludes the possibility that the alleged
co-conspirators acted independently or based upon a legitimate business purpose.") (emphasis
added).
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discussion of the motive element.9 ' InAdvanced Marine Enterprises,
Inc. v. PRC, Inc., 19 PRC filed suit in equity against Advanced
Marine Enterprises ("AME") under the conspiracy statute when a
number of PRC's marine engineering employees left PRC and moved
to a competitor, AME.' 92 PRC informed the employees that due to
the loss of some of PRC's marine engineering contracts, they should
look for other employment.1 93 The chancellor, however, ruling in
favor of PRC, focused on the fact that AME and the PRC engineering
employees developed a covert plan to move to AME without regard
to the obviously permissible motivation of self-preservation for those
faced with losing their jobs.'94
AME appealed the chancellor's finding on the ground that under
Greenspan v. Osheroft,95 the chancellor was required to find, when
evidence of mixed motivations existed, that AME and the employees
acted with the primary purpose of injuring PRC.'96 While the
supreme court rejected this argument, it did not address the issue
of mixed motives. Rather, it relied on Commercial Business Systems,
Inc. v. BellSouth Services, Inc.'9 for the proposition that "Code §§
18.2-499 and -500 do not require a plaintiff to prove that a conspira-
tor's primary and overriding purpose is to injure another in his trade
or business."' Whereas Commercial Business Systems seemingly
recognized the continuing vitality of the primary and overriding
purpose requirement of Greenspan-albeit limited to cases where the
defendants had mixed motivations for their actions-the court in
Advanced Marine did not address this important distinction.
Because, like the Sherman Act, the BCA contains such extreme
remedies-recovery of treble damages and attorney's fees-its use
should be confined to cases where evidence of conspiracy and motive
to harm the plaintiff is clear. Indeed, like the federal antitrust
standard, plaintiffs in such cases should be required to produce
evidence that tends to exclude the possibility of independent action.
190. See Advanced Marine Enters., Inc. v. PRC, Inc., 256 Va. 106, 116-17, 501 S.E.2d 151,
154 (1998).
191. Id.
192. See id. at 114, 501 S.E.2d at 152.
193. See id. at 111, 501 S.E.2d at 151.
194. See id. at 115, 501 S.E.2d at 153, 155.
195. 232 Va. 388, 351 S.E.2d 28 (1986).
196. See PRC, 256 Va. at 116-17, 501 S.E.2d at 154.
197. 249 Va. 39, 453 S.E.2d 261 (1995).
198. See PRC, 256 Va. at 117, 501 S.E.2d at 154 (citing Commercial Bus. Sys., 249 Va. at
47, 453 S.E.2d at 267).
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Such an approach appears to have been taken by the United
States District Court for the Western District of Virginia in
Wuchenich v. Shenandoah Memorial Hospital,'99 where the court,
consistent with the strict scrutiny applied to other physician
conspiracy cases in recent years, dismissed a claim brought against
Shenandoah Memorial Hospital ("SMH") and members of its medical
staff alleging common law conspiracy and statutory conspiracy in
violation of the BCA.200 Plaintiff Wuchenich, a California anesthesi-
ologist, claimed he was recruited by SMH and joined its staff in
1995.201 Wuchenich alleged that once he began practicing at SMH,
other doctors felt threatened by the competition posed by him and
his sister, also a new physician to SMH practicing in the fields of
obstetrics and gynecology.2"2 Wuchenich claimed that as a result of
this perceived threat, the other doctors at SMH conspired and
agreed not to request his services.2 °3 Twice when Wuchenich's
services were used he became the subject of the medical staff peer
review process at the request of Dr. Karmy, another obstetrics and
gynecology practitioner.2 4
Regarding the BCA allegations, the district court adopted
Magistrate Judge Crigler's recommendation of Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal.20 " The court noted that "The first element of any civil
conspiracy, whether common law or statutory, is that there was
agreement among co-conspirators.2 6 Therefore, the court held that
the plaintiff must allege facts that show that the defendants shared
a unity of purpose or common design to injure the plaintiff,207 and
that "Independent acts by several individuals do not necessarily
constitute a conspiracy without showing such a meeting of the
minds."208
The court found this necessary element lacking, holding that
Wuchenich produced only "a bare, conclusory allegation" of conspir-
acy.20 9 The court noted that two of the alleged co-conspirators were
199. No. 98-0041-H (W.D. Va. Jan. 29, 1999).
200. See id.; see also VA. CODEANN. §§ 18.2-499, -500 (Repl. Vol. 1996 & Cum. Supp. 1999).
201. See Wuchenich, No. 98-0041-H, slip op. at 2.
202. See id., slip op. at 3.
203. See id.
204. See id.
205. See id., slip op. at 1-2.
206. Id., slip op. at 10.
207. See id. (citing Brown v. Angelone, 938 F. Supp. 340, 346 (W.D. Va. 1996)).
208. Id. (citing Murdaugh Volkswagen, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank of S.C., 639 F.2d 1073 (4th
Cir. 1981)).
209. Id.
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not even members of the hospital staff at the same time for more
than a month.21 ° The plaintiff did produce evidence that a member
of the hospital administration and an alleged conspiring doctor held
a conversation about "getting rid" of the plaintiff because he would
not work with them.21' However, the court found that this evidence
did not support the existence of any conspiracy because the alleged
conspiring doctor shared that information with the plaintiff.212
Further, the court found that the plaintiffs allegation that Dr.
Karmy's alleged motivation against the plaintiff-the perceived
competitive threat posed by his sister - suggested "an independent
reason for Dr. Karmy to strive to undermine plaintiff, rather than
any unity with the other alleged co-conspirators."2 3
The court's treatment of the plaintiffs conclusory BCA allegations
and willingness to consider issues of motive at the pleading stage
suggest that the Supreme Court of Virginia's 1998 opinion in
Advanced Marine Enterprises, Inc. v. PRC, Inc. 214 may not alter the
restrictive manner in which courts have analyzed claims under this
treble damages statute. Indeed, given the extreme remedy created
by the BCA for treble damages and attorney's fees, it is appropriate
for courts to subject such claims to strict scrutiny and only allow
them to proceed upon the existence of allegations and evidence
establishing a conspiracy to injure another. As the Wuchenich case
demonstrates, allegations that do not establish a meeting of the
minds are insufficient to give rise to an actionable conspiracy claim,
and allegations that do not clearly demonstrate the motive to injure
another should be dismissed -as failing to state a claim. This latter
notion finds support in a footnote in the Wuchenich opinion, in which
the court suggested that another reason for dismissal of the BCA
claim was that the plaintiff failed to allege an unlawful purpose or
unlawful methods.215
The Wuchenich court also based its conclusion-that the conspir-
acy claim alleged by the plaintiff physician was not actionable-on
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. See id., slip op. at 11.
213. Id.
214. 256 Va. 106, 501 S.E.2d 148 (1998). See supra text accompanying notes 190-98.
215. See Wuchenich, No. 98-0041-H, slip op. at 12 n.2 (citing Hechler Chevrolet, Inc. v.
General Motors Corp., 230 Va. 396, 402, 337 S.E.2d 744, 748 (1985)). The court noted that the
acts allegedly undertaken by defendants in conducting a peer review and reporting the results
were not unlawful. See id.; see also Werth v. Fire Cos.' Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 160 Va. 845,
855, 171 S.E. 255, 258 (1933) ("[T]here can be no conspiracy to do a legitimate act, an act
which the law allows, nor malice therein. To give action there must not only be a conspiracy,
but a conspiracy to do a wrongful act.").
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the basis of the intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine.216 Under this
doctrine, a conspiracy between a corporation and its agents acting
as employees is a "legal impossibility."217 While noting the existence
of the independent personal stake exception,218 the court declined
plaintiffs suggestion to apply that exception to this case.219 Indeed,
following the Fourth Circuit's decision in Oksanen v. Page Memorial
Hospital,22° the Wuchenich court held that the reasoning in Oksanen
applied directly to the facts alleged in plaintiffs complaint by stating
that "Even a doctor in direct competition with plaintiff cannot be
deemed to have a personal financial interest in disciplining that
doctor because the medical staff does not have enough control over
the hospital to 'cause a restraint to be imposed."22'
E. Practice and Procedure: Subpoenas Issued to Nonparties in
Antitrust Litigation Calling for Production of Confidential
Business Records
In two recent antitrust cases Virginia federal courts wrestled with
the conflicting interests of the need for party litigants to develop
their cases and the potential harm to nonparties from disclosure of
their confidential business records. In each case, the subpoena was
met with resistance from the nonparty. In United States v. Motorola,
Inc.,222 Nextel, one of the codefendants, subpoenaed documents from
nonparty Ericsson, Inc., of Lynchburg, Virginia, requesting a wide
216. See Wuchenich, No. 98-0041-H, slip op. at 11.
217. Id. (citing Selman v. American Sports Underwriters, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 225,238 (W.D.
Va. 1988).
218. See id.; see also Greenville Publ'g Co. v. Daily Reflector, Inc., 496 F.2d 391 (4th Cir.
1974). In Greenville Publishing, the publisher of a free newspaper comprised almost
completely ofadvertisingbrought an antitrust action against a competitor and its officers who
were also the publishers of the regular local newspaper. See id. at 393-94. In regards to the
conspiracy claim, the court recognized that a corporation cannot be guilty of conspiring with
its officers or agents. See id. at 399. The court made an exception to the general rule,
however, because the officer of the competitor had "an independent personal stake in
achieving the corporation's illegal objective." Id. (citing America's Best Cinema Corp. v. Fort
Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 347 F. Supp. 328, 332 (N.D. Ind. 1972)).
219. See Wuchenich, No. 98-0041-H, slip op. at 12.
220. 945 F.2d 696, 706 (4th Cir 1991) (holding that the personal stake exception did not
extend to members of a medical staff who were in competition with a doctor who was
subjected to the peer review process).
221. Wuchenich, No. 98-0041-H, slip op. at 12 (quoting Oksanen, 945 F.2d at 705).
'Because the challenged decision was subject to review by the hospital and because
decisionmaking authority in [plaintiffs] case was dispersed among a number of individuals,
the personal stake exception is inapplicable.'" Id. (quoting Oksanen, 945 F.2d at 706).
222. No. 1:94-CV-02331 (W.D. Va. May 19, 1999).
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swath of information involving Ericsson's products, its future
business plans, and its competition with plaintiff Nextel.22 The
discovery dispute arose out of Nextel's petition to modify an
antitrust consent decree with the United States and Nextel's
contention that it needed information regarding Ericsson's products
and marketing plans to demonstrate that competitive circumstances
had changed, thus warranting relief from the decree.224 Ericsson
filed a motion to quash the subpoena, contending that it was
overbroad, unduly burdensome, and that production of the requested
documents would disclose confidential and proprietary business
information.225 In responding to the subpoena, Ericsson took the
position that production of its confidential business records was not
necessary as the trade press already contained sufficient information
regarding its new products sufficient to satisfy Nextel's litigation
needs.226 For its part, Nextel took the position that the requested
discovery should be allowed because of the existence of a protective
order in place in the case pending in the district court in Washing-
ton, D.C.
227
Judge Moon of the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia resolved the dispute by placing strict limits on
the information Ericsson was required to produce.228 Judge Moon
required Ericsson to produce a witness to authenticate the press
releases and public documents that Ericsson previously produced to
Nextel.229 Ericsson was also required to produce certain documents
expressly referring to Nextel, although the court gave Ericsson the
ability to redact any information or documents that disclosed
strategic business plans or information directly related to Ericsson's
plans to deal with Nextel as a competitor.23 ° The court declined to
require Ericsson to produce any other information, particularly the
future business and marketing plans requested by Nextel.
23
'
In re Motorsports Merchandise Antitrust Litigation232 similarly
juxtaposed competing interests of parties and bystanders in distant
antitrust litigation. Plaintiffs in that case brought a class action
223. See id., slip op. at 1.
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. See id., slip op. at 2.
229. See id.
230. See id.
231. See id.
232. 186 F.R.D. 344 (W.D. Va. 1999).
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ostensibly on behalf of automobile racing fans alleging a conspiracy
to fix the prices of racing souvenirs at NASCAR Winston Cup
races.23 The price fixing suit, pending in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia, charged that licensed
vendors at NASCAR Winston Cup races fixed the prices of souvenirs
between January 1, 1991 and the present.234
Plaintiffs subpoenaed nonparty Buck Fever Racing, Inc. ("Buck
Fever"), a Southwest Virginia retailer of NASCAR merchandise at
locations other than Winston Cup races, to produce virtually all of
its records dating from January 1, 1991.235 Plaintiffs sought
production from Buck Fever ostensibly because it was a "bench-
mark" firm against which its expert witnesses could evaluate
whether the market for sale of NASCAR souvenirs was impacted by
the alleged price fixing conspiracy.236 The Buck Fever records were
especially vital to the plaintiffs because, although approximately
twenty such businesses were subpoenaed, Buck Fever was one of the
only such businesses that had sold NASCAR merchandise continu-
ously since 1991.237
The court was reluctant to grant plaintiffs motion to compel,
calling the subpoena "broad on its face" and noting that compliance
would result in a "great effort of time and expense" for Buck
Fever.23 8 Nevertheless, the court recognized that the plaintiffs
demonstrated substantial need for the records and obviously were
concerned by Buck Fever's three month delay in retaining counsel
and responding to the subpoena.239 As a consequence, and despite
the breadth of the subpoena, the court found "little justification for
quashing the subpoena in its entirety."24 ° Instead, the court deferred
production of any documents in response to the subpoena until after
the Georgia district court ruled on the motion for class
certification.24 ' The court resolved the concerns over the cost
associated with the production by requiring plaintiffs to reimburse
Buck Fever for all reasonable costs incurred in the production of the
233. See id. at 346.
234. See id.
235. See id.
236. See id. at 347.
237. See id. at 348.
238. Id. at 349.
239. See id. at 350.
240. Id.
241. See id.
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requested documents.242 Further, the court indicated that the
protective order in place in the Georgia litigation was adequate to
address the concerns of Buck Fever regarding disclosure of sensitive,
confidential financial information.243
In each of these cases, the court expressed concern over the cost
and burden imposed on nonparties to antitrust litigation, while
simultaneously striving to ensure that litigants obtain sufficient
information to try their cases in distant forums.
IV. FEDERAL REGULATORY, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND ENFORCEMENT
EFFORTS
The Department of Justice continues to advance its investigation
and prosecution of foreclosure auction bid rigging in Northern
Virginia, resulting in two more indictments-those against Kenneth
R. Arnold and Alan Shams.244 The indictments charge Arnold and
Shams with conspiring with a group of real estate speculators who
agreed not to bid against each other at real estate foreclosure
auctions, thereby allowing the group to purchase real estate for
depressed, noncompetitive prices. 24 5
The indictments allege that the conspirators would suppress
bidding at public auctions, allowing a designated bidder to purchase
property.246 Later, they would meet at a second, secret auction where
each conspirator would bid an amount above the public auction
price, and the highest bidder would win the property.247 The
difference between the public auction price and the secret auction
price would be divided among the conspirators as payoffs.248 Arnold
is also charged with mail fraud in connection with mailing a payoff
in the furtherance of the bid-rigging scheme.249
Eight other individuals have pled guilty or have been convicted as
a result of the ongoing investigation.25 The Antitrust Division is
conducting its investigation with the assistance of the FBI.251
242. See id.
243. See id.
244. See United States v. Arnold, No. 98-305-A (E.D. Va. Aug. 13, 1998).
245. See Price Fixing: Northern Virginia Real Estate Speculators are Cited forBid Rigging,
75 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1874, at 216 (Aug. 20, 1998).
246. See id.
247. See id.
248. See id.
249. See id.
250. See id.
251. See id.
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The Supreme Court declined to review a Fourth Circuit decision
that sustained the convictions ofMija S. Romer and Khem C. Batra
for violating the Sherman Act.252 Romer was also convicted of
conspiracy to defraud the IRS and bank fraud.253 The convictions
arose from a conspiracy to rig bids on nine properties sold at public
auction and conspiracy to evade the payment of federal taxes. 254 The
Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of judgments of
acquittal and affirmed the judgments against each. 5
The FTC achieved consent decrees as settlements to three cases
that were filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, Alexandria Division.256 The decrees were a result
of "Operation Mousetrap," which targeted firms that sold fraudulent
invention promotion services.257 The first consent decree dictates
that six corporate defendants contribute to a redress fund of
$250,000 that will be used to redress those consumers who pur-
chased the fraudulent promotion services.258 The decree also
stipulates that the defendants are forbidden to make false claims as
to the likelihood of success of their programs, past program success,
and amount of royalties received by the defendants' customers.259 All
three settlements were approved by the court on November 17,
1998.260
Finally, Virginia participated with seven other states and the
FTC in a settlement with United Industries Corp., a manufacturer
of a termite bait system.26' The manufacturer was charged with
misrepresenting the effectiveness of its product.262 As part of the
252. See United States v. Romer, 148 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1032
(1999).
253. See id. at 363.
254. See id.
255. See id. at 372. For a more complete discussion of the Fourth Circuits decision, see
Michael F. Urbanski & James R. Creekmore, Antitrust and Trade Regulation Law, 32 U.
RICH. L. REV. 973, 1004-06 (1998).
256. The cases that led to the settlement were FTC v. American Invention Associates, Inc.,
No. 97-1114-A (E.D. Va. Nov. 19, 1998); FTC v. Dornan, No. 97-1114-A (E.D. Va. Nov. 19,
1998); and FTC v. Waxman, No. 97-1114-A (E.D. Va. Nov. 19, 1998).
257. See Brenda Mack, Invention Promotion Firms Agree to Settle FTC Charges and Pay
$250,000 in Consumer Redress (last modified Nov. 19, 1998) <http'//www.ftc.gov/opa/
1998/9811aia.htm>.
258. See id.
259. See id.
260. See id.
261. See Deceptive Practices: Termite Bait System Marketer Settles FTC, State Charges of
Deception, 76 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1902, at 298 (Mar. 25, 1999).
262. See id.
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settlement, the company must refrain from making claims regarding
the effectiveness of its product in the absence of reliable scientific
information.263
V. LEGISLATION
On October 27, 1998, President Clinton signed into law the Curt
Flood Act of 1998.264 The law substantially limits professional
baseball's judicially-created antitrust exemption by allowing for
antitrust actions by professional baseball players against the
league.2 6 The law does not apply to the minor leagues or to team
relocations.266 The law is named for the first baseball player to take
his challenge against baseball's reserve clause to the U.S. Supreme
Court.267 The reserve clause bound players to certain teams for the
length of their professional careers.268
VI. CONCLUSION
Virginia's courts remain steadfast in their reluctance to allow
antitrust claims of questionable validity to proceed to trial. Courts
remain skeptical of contrived conspiracy claims, and it would appear
that market participants are left to thrive or die in Darwinian
fashion on the competitive playing field. Moreover, as the market
shifts from defined physical and geographic boundaries to the
limitless expanse of the Internet, competition from all sources can
be expected to intensify, thereby giving rise to more challenges by
those ill-equipped to compete in a high-tech society. It also can be
expected that FTC regulation and prosecution of Internet activity
may increase. Whether the Supreme Court, the Fourth Circuit, or
the Virginia courts will give credence to such claims and prosecu-
tions remains to be seen.
263. See id.
264. 15 U.S.C.A. § 27a (Cum. Supp. 1999).
265. See id.
266. See id.
267. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
268. See id. at 259-60.
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